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COMMENT
BEING OLD AND OBVIOUS: APOTEX V. SANOFI-SYNTHELABO IN THE
SUPREME COURT*
*

David Vaver

In Apotex Inc v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc 2008 SCC 61, the Supreme
Court held, affirming the lower courts, that allegations that Sanofi‟s patent
for a blood anti-coagulant was invalid for obviousness and lack of novelty
were unjustified. In doing so, the Court modified the criteria of anticipation
and obviousness found in Beloit Canada Ltd v Valmet OY (1986), 8 CPR(3d)
289 (Fed CA), to align them more closely with European and American
practice. The Court found that the lower courts had erred in not recognizing
that anticipation requires both disclosure and enablement, and that
obviousness may require an investigation into whether or not it was “more or
less self-evident” to try the course that led to the invention. The English 5step method of analyzing obviousness was adopted. The decision, while based
on a pre-1989 patent, seems to apply equally to post-1989 ones. The paper
takes the opportunity of discussing other statements in Beloit that have
sometimes been misunderstood. It concludes by applauding the lack of
discussion about the invention‟s commercial success on the issue of
unobviousness.
Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto; Emeritus Professor of Intellectual Property & Information Technology Law,
University of Oxford; Emeritus Fellow, St Peter‟s College, Oxford.
* This paper is a slightly revised version of one delivered at the Federal Court Judges‟
Annual Seminar held in Montreal on 7-8 October 2009. My thanks to Rothstein J and
Hughes J for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Remaining errors and infelicities
are mine alone.
*
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In Apotex Inc v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc, the Supreme
Court held that allegations that Sanofi‟s patent for the blood anticoagulant Plavix® (clopidogrel bilsulphate) was invalid, because the
invention was old or obvious, were unjustified. Apotex, which had
made those allegations when seeking a notice of compliance from
Health Canada to market a generic version of the drug, therefore had
to wait to until Sanofi‟s patent expired to market it.
The trial judge (Shore J) had reached the same result as the
Supreme Court, and was affirmed in fact and law by the Federal Court
of Appeal (Noël JA, Richard CJ and Evans JA concurring).1 In
reaffirming, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment delivered
by Rothstein J, subtly but significantly tightened the standards of
novelty and unobviousness that inventions must meet in Canada,
aligning them more closely with European and American practice.2
This paper is a comment on this decision.
I
To be considered old or obvious is not always a bad thing. We
talk of the good old days, good old wine, even good old academics and
(I dare say) good old judges; and making things seem obvious is what
many a lecturer aspires to, though less often realizes.
Elsewhere, being old or obvious can be a less positive
attribute. The good old days were not always that good; old wine can
turn sour, as indeed can old academics. Being obvious is not always
good either; the speaker who belabours the obvious risks losing his
audience. So does the one who recycles stuff the audience already
knows.
Patent law is categorical on the subject of oldness and
obviousness: they are vices. If perchance the patent office does grant a
Apotex Inc v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc, 2008 SCC 61, [2008] 3 SCR 265, aff‟ing
2006 FCA 421, 59 CPR (4th) 46, aff‟ing 2005 FC 390, 39 CPR (4th) 202 [ Sanofi]. The
Supreme Court also affirmed on conventional grounds both courts‟ holding that
Apotex‟s allegation of double patenting was unjustified; this paper omits discussion of
that aspect.
2 Decisions already interpreting and applying Sanofi include Apotex Inc v. Pfizer
Canada Inc, 2009 FCA 8 at22ff (Noël JA, Létourneau & Blais JJA concurring);
Ratiopharm Inc v. Pfizer Ltd, 2009 FC 711 at 158ff (Hughes J); Lundbeck Canada Inc
v. Canada (Health), 2009 FC 146 at 53ff (Harrington J).
1
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patent for an old or obvious invention, the grant is void from the start
and may be struck off the register, on re-examination by the patent
office or in impeachment proceedings before the federal court. Patent
law aims to encourage the production of new and different
technologies and processes for the overall benefit of society and the
economy: whatever is already known or achievable by anybody
without much thought or difficulty deserves no monopoly or social
reward beyond the usual chance to compete in the marketplace. It is
in the public interest that anyone be entitled to do, make or deal with
the old or the obvious as and when he or she likes, without hindrance
or payment.
By “old”, patent law does not mean “ancient”; it means “not
new”, something different from what previously existed. The need to
be “new” was central right from the first patent laws. Venice‟s Law of
1474 provided for a 10-year grant of monopoly for “any new and
ingenious device, not previously made in our jurisdiction,” and
England‟s Statute of Monopolies of 1624 also gave the “true and first
inventor” of “any manner of new manufactures within the realm” the
right to a 14-year monopoly. But even words like “new” need
defining, and their meaning can change over time. In referring to
things “not previously made” in Venice, the Venetian statute implied
that something well known outside the city state could qualify for a
Venetian patent if it was unknown locally. That was true under the
English Act of 1624 too: what was old in France could be new in
England, and the first importer of a new manufacture was treated as
the “true and first inventor” under English law. The idea was to
encourage new industry, and the first importer certainly qualified
there.
Today, of course, novelty is looked at globally, and first
importers are no longer considered inventors, nor are they entitled to
patents. Nor even is the innovator who toils to produce something
that, unbeknownst to him, has already been sold in Kazakhstan or
published in some obscure journal in some obscure language. Prior
sale or publication of the invention anywhere in the world, however
isolated and inaccessible, is fatal to any later claim of novelty for it in
other jurisdictions.
The need for a patentable invention to be unobvious came
later. The criterion was absent from legislation through the 19th
century, and indeed did not make it into the Canadian Patent Act

5

until 1989. But it was part of most countries‟ law, including Canada‟s,
well before then. Judges said that the very idea of invention implied
inventive ingenuity, without which an advance was obvious and
undeserving of a monopoly. Patents went to those who thought and
acted outside the box of obviousness; obvious advances were patentfree zones.3
As with novelty, what obviousness meant – beyond “very
plain” – was not itself obvious. In England, before trying patent cases
became the monopoly of the chancery judges, juries often decided
questions of obviousness, and still do in the United States. Quite apart
from the added unpredictability of jury decisions, what qualifies as
obvious has varied over time and place as knowledge has expanded,
and attitudes on monopoly, innovation and international
competitiveness have fluctuated. Abraham Lincoln said the patent
system “added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius”,4 and courts
sometimes demanded that inventions show some spark of genius
before calling them unobvious.
That viewpoint, however, waned as beneficial discoveries
came less from lone geniuses working in basements than from
corporate researchers experimenting methodically in modern wellequipped laboratories. The “patient searcher is as much entitled to the
benefits of a monopoly as someone who hits upon an invention by
some lucky chance or an inspiration”, said an English patents judge in
the 1970s, and the Supreme Court of Canada agreed.5 The basic issue
may be whether or not the inventor had disclosed something
“sufficiently inventive to deserve the grant of a monopoly”,6 but what
qualifies is a question of degree that may strike different minds
differently. No wonder Learned Hand CJ found the whole concept of
Unobviousness is like the criterion of originality in copyright law. Originality was
deduced as essential from language in early copyright statutes that referred to
“authors” and “works”.
4 A Lincoln, “Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions” (1859), in D Vaver,
Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law (Routledge, 2006), vol. 3, 36.
5 American Cyanamid Co v. Berk Pharmaceuticals Ltd , [1976] RPC 231, 257 (Ch),
Whitford J, cited with approval in Farbwerke Hoechst AG v. Halocarbon (Ont) Ltd,
[1979] 2 SCR 929, 944, Pigeon J [Halocarbon].
6 Société Technique de Pulverisation STEP v. Emson Europe Ltd , [1993] RPC 513, 519
(CA), Hoffmann LJ; Janssen-Ortho Inc v. Novopharm Ltd, 2006 FC 1234 at 110,
Hughes J [Janssen-Ortho], aff‟d 2007 FCA 217 (Sharlow JA, Nadon & Malone JJA
concurring).
3
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unobviousness elusive: “as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a
phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts,”7 or as
Frank J put it more poetically, “the adventures of judges‟ souls among
inventions”.8 Reviewing the Canadian case law through to the 1950s,
Harold Fox agreed, concluding that obviousness “in the end is what
the judges say it is.”9
II
What was in issue in Apotex v. Sanofi? Sanofi had a 1985
patent for a broad class of anti-coagulant compounds. The claims
covered all versions of the compounds (250,000 or more in all),
including the racemates and constituent isomers. Sanofi had not tested
the whole class but its claims extended, as Canadian patent law
permits, to the genus of compounds with predicted similar properties
to those it had successfully tested.
After filing for the patent, Sanofi continued its research into
improved coagulants. Some false leads later, a Sanofi chemist was
asked to try to isolate the isomers of one of the compounds to see how
they or their derivatives might perform. The research involved using
known techniques and trial and error, with no guarantee that any
experiment would likely yield the isomers or any better resulting
compound. As it turned out, the isomers were able to be isolated and
the bisulphate salt of one of the isomers (the enantiomer that rightrotated polarized light) proved a better and less toxic anti-coagulant
than the rest of the patented compounds, including the other mirror-

Harries v. Air King Products Co (1950), 183 F 2d 158 at 162 (2d Cir).
Picard v. United Aircraft (1942), 53 USPQ 563, 569 (2d Cir) concurring, cert den 317
US 651 (1942), cited at first instance in Halocarbon case n 5 above (1974), 15 CPR(2d)
7
8

105, 112 (Fed TD, Collier J), affd by the SCC, n 5 above. The full quotation reads:
“Invention,” for patent purposes, has been difficult to define. Efforts to cage the
concept in words have proved almost as unsuccessful as attempts verbally to imprison
the concept “beautiful.” Indeed, when one reads most discussions of “invention,” one
recalls Kipling‟s, “It‟s pretty, but is it Art?” and the aphorism that there is no sense in
disputes about matters of taste. Anatole France once said that literary criticism is the
adventure of the critic‟s soul among masterpieces. To the casual observer, judicial
patent decisions are the adventures of judges‟ souls among inventions. For a decision
as to whether or not a thing is an invention is a “value” judgment…
9 H G Fox, “Copyright and Patent Protection: A Study in Contrasts” (1957), 12 U.T.L.J.
27 at 33.
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image isomer and the combined racemate from which the successful
isomer was isolated.
In 1988, Sanofi filed for a patent on the isomer in its various
forms, including clopidogrel bisulphate, the salt form of the effective
ingredient of what became Plavix®. It was this patent,10 eventually
granted in 1995, that Apotex challenged. Apotex said the isomer and
its salt were disclosed in Sanofi‟s 1985 patent and were therefore not
new; or, at least, making that isomer or its salt was obvious, given
what the 1985 patent revealed and what ordinary pharmachemists
working in the field would have done or surmised. Apotex also
challenged the whole idea that one can get a fresh patent for a better
singleton selected from an undifferentiated class. The technological
equivalent of picking the class‟s gold medallist before the exams are
sat and marked was, according to Apotex, not something the patent
law was meant to cover or encourage.
Apotex‟s arguments failed before Shore J and the Federal
Court of Appeal on conventional grounds. Both courts relied largely
on language in a 1986 decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, Beloit
Canada Ltd v. Valmet OY,11 which was then the “landmark decision
[that] defined” both anticipation and obviousness.12 The courts noted
that selection patents in the chemical field had long been upheld in
Canadian law, and with them the concept that an item selected from a
patented class that was shown to work better or differently from its
classmates could be considered new. They agreed that Sanofi‟s first
patent included claims on the isomer that was the focus of Sanofi‟s
later patent; but simply being claimed as part of an undifferentiated
group of compounds did not disclose the isomer as something
different from, and better than, the mass. Being one individual in the
crowd at a rugby match does not disclose this attender to the world
unless the television camera happens to alight on him and broadcast
The use of chiral chemistry to patent isomers extracted from an earlier patented
general compound is a popular strategy among pharmaceutical companies “to develop
replacements for the pharmaceuticals which are about to lose their patent protection”:
B. Domeij, Pharmaceutical Patents in Europe (2000), 149. Sanofi filed similar patents
worldwide. Its US patent was upheld (Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc (2008), 550 F
3d 1075 (Fed Cir), aff‟ing 492 F Supp 353 (SDNY 2007)), but its Australian patent was
not (Apotex Pty Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis,[2008] FCA 1194). The Supreme Court of
Canada mentioned neither case in its Sanofi judgment.
11 Beloit Canada Ltd v. Valmet OY (1986), 8 CPR (3d) 289 (Hugessen JA) [ Beloit].
12 Sanofi, supra note 1.
10
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his image. More specifically, nothing in the first patent taught the
skilled reader “in every case and without possibility of error” to
produce the second isomer, nor were its special properties mentioned;
therefore the isomer had not been anticipated by the prior patent.
The obviousness argument was rejected because isolating the
isomer was not an obvious step to take in the quest for a better
coagulant, in light of what the prior patent and the common general
knowledge available to the ordinary skilled pharmachemist.
The Supreme Court dismissed Apotex‟s appeal, but changed
previous understandings of the law of novelty and unobviousness as
expressed in Beloit. It made the following points:
1. It reaffirmed that the Canadian law of patents was
statutory: there is no common law of patents.13
2. It confirmed that the grant of selection patents was
consistent with the Patent Act and acceptable in principle. The
criteria applied in Commonwealth (and until recently British) courts
were helpful guides.14 Although chemical inventions were the main
candidates, other inventions could also qualify.15 Whether the first
patent was held by the second patentee or a third party did not
matter.16
3. To find that an invention was anticipated by the prior art
and so was already “known or used” or “described” in a prior patent or
publication,17 the Supreme Court confirmed that the prior art not only
had to: (a) disclose the invention, but also – and this was novel – (b)
enable the skilled worker to produce it.
4. Under requirement (a), the disclosure must give directions
that, inevitably, would produce the claimed invention, or must for all
Supra note 1at 12, citing Comm‟r of Patents v. Farbwerke Hoechst AG, [1964] SCR
49, 57, as well as recent House of Lords authority
14 Supra note 1 at 9 & 19, calling Maugham J‟s decision in Re I G Farbenindustrie AG‟s
Patents (1930), 47 RPC 289 (Ch) the “locus classicus”.; similarly under the Patents
Act 1977 (UK): Selection patents are analysed differently in the UK and EU, which no
longer follows the I G Farbenindustrie case: Dr Reddy‟s Laboratories (UK) Ltd v Eli
Lilly & Co Ltd, [2009] EWCA Civ 1362.
15 Supra note 1 at 99.
16 Ibid at 98.
17 Patent Act, s.27(1) (pre-1989). Cf present Patent Act, s 28.2(1)(b), applicable to
post-1989 patents: subject-matter that is “disclosed...in such a manner” that it
“became available to the public” anywhere is anticipated.
13
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practical purposes be equal to that in the patent.18 If the skilled
worker can discover the invention only after undertaking
experiments, it is not disclosed. Rothstein J cited an 1862 English case,
Hill v. Evans,19 that continued as “unquestionable authority” in the
UK and that he plainly considered equally authoritative in Canada.
The passage in question, which Rothstein J did not cite at length,
includes the following:
[K]nowledge, and the means of obtaining knowledge, are
[not] the same. There is a great difference between them.
To carry me to the place at which I wish to arrive is very
different from merely putting me on the road that leads to
it. There may be a latent truth in the words of a former
writer, not known even to the writer himself; and it would
be unreasonable to say that there is no merit in discovering
and unfolding it to the world.20

That was the position in Sanofi. The isomer was certainly
referred to and included within the claims in the first patent, but its
special advantages were nowhere mentioned because they were then
unknown. The lower courts rightly rejected the anticipation attack on
this ground.
5. Under requirement (b) – enablement – the disclosure must
contain enough information to allow the later invention to be
performed without undue burden. Routine trial and error that is not
“prolonged or arduous” is acceptable.21 Just disclosing the theoretical
formula of a compound may not disclose the compound itself unless
the compound has actually been prepared or the skilled worker would
know, from the given directions or his ordinary knowledge, how to go
about making it.22 On this theory, a disclosure may be a prior
publication even though wrong directions on how to work the
Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc, [2000] 2 SCR 1024 at 25-27, Binnie J; Reeves
Brothers Inc v. Toronto Quilting & Embroidery Ltd (1978), 43 CPR (2d) 145, 157 (Fed
18

TD) , Gibson J.
19 (1862), 4 De G F & J 288.
20 Ibid at 301-2, by Westbury LC; approved in Synthon BV v. Smithkline Beecham
plc, [2005] UKHL 59 at 20, Hoffmann L [Synthon].
21 Supra note 1 at 37, #3.
22 Beecham Group Ltd's New Zealand (Amoxycillin) App‟n , [1982] FSR 181 (NZCA);
Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Enzyme Ltd, [1993] FSR 716, 725-6 (Pat Ct).
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invention are given, if the skilled worker would easily detect and
correct the mistake by routine trial and error.23
Rothstein J said the lower courts had overlooked this aspect of
anticipation, which he took from recent House of Lords authority24
and which is of long standing in the US.25 The error was nonetheless
harmless because the anticipation attack had already failed under
requirement (a). He indicated however, obiter, that there was
probably no enablement, given Shore J‟s findings under (a) that it had
taken the inventor 6 months of trial and error to isolate the isomer:
this effort was probably an “undue burden”.26
6. The Court concluded that the lower courts had rightly, as
far as they went, found that the invention was unobvious, but had
wrongly not considered whether or not it was “obvious to try” to
isolate the isomer. Prior Canadian caselaw categorically rejecting the
“obvious to try” test27 was inconsistent with modern UK and US
authority and is now implicitly overruled. In fields where
experimentation was common, it may be appropriate to ask whether
or not it was “more or less self-evident” to try the course that led to
the invention.28 All the relevant facts must be considered, including
such things as the history of the invention, the motive to find a
solution to a known problem, and the number and extent of avenues
of research.29
7. Without saying such an approach was compulsory, the
Supreme Court thought the structured approach to analyzing
obviousness that English courts had pioneered and refined could
usefully be adopted in Canada, namely by following these five steps:
 First, identify the notional person skilled in the art to whom the
claim is addressed at the priority date.
 Second, identify the common general knowledge of that person.

Supra note 1 at 37, #4; Synthon, supra note 20, at 20.
Viz., Synthon, ibid.
25 Seymour v. Osborne (1870), 78 US 516.
26 Supra note 1 at 47-48.
27 Eg, Bayer AG v. Apotex Inc (1995), 60 CPR (3d) 58, 77-82 (Ont GD), Lederman J,
23
24

aff‟d (1998), 82 CPR (3d) 526 (Ont CA), leave to appeal denied [1998] SCCA No 563
[Bayer].
28 Supra note 1 at 69.
29 Ibid. at 59 & 69.
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 Third, construe the claim and identify its inventive concept.
 Fourth, identify the differences between the claimed invention
and the state of the art.
 Fifth, set aside any knowledge of the claimed invention, and
decide whether those differences involve steps that would have
been very plain to the skilled person, or would require some
invention.30
Having gone through the first four steps, Rothstein J thought
it would not have been obvious for the skilled pharmachemist to try
the course that led to the isolation of the claimed isomer. It was not
self-evident: (a) which of the thousands of compounds in the 1985
patent should be selected for further research; (b) that the research
should comprise isolating the isomers of the racemate of that
compound; and (c) that the claimed isomer would be better and less
toxic than the other isomer or the racemate in which it was found.
The Court was impressed by the fact that Sanofi chemists, who had at
least the skill of the average pharmachemist in the field (and probably
a lot more), had spent some years and millions of dollars taking the
racemate through to clinical trials without thinking to isolate the
isomer and develop its bisulphate salt. If they had not thought it
obvious to try that course, it would not have been obvious to the
notional skilled pharmachemist.31
III
The following points are among those suggested by the Sanofi
opinion:
1. The law on unobviousness as stated by the Court applies
equally to pre-1989 and post-1989 patents.32 Rothstein J noted that he
was applying judge-made law on obviousness to the Sanofi pre-1989
patent but, in doing so, he drew on much English case law under the
Patents Act 1977 (UK). The 1977 Act‟s provisions on obviousness are
very close to those of the Canadian post-1989 Act;33 so English case
Ibid. at 67, adopting the approach in Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA, [2007] EWCA Civ
588 at 23.
31 Ibid at 92.
32 Janssen-Ortho, supra note 6 at 109.
33 Under Patents Act 1977 (UK), ss 3 and 2(2), an invention must not be “obvious to a
person skilled in the art”, having regard to anything “made available to the public”
30
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law will be equally useful guidance where no Canadian authority is on
point. The same holds broadly true for the law of novelty on pre-1989
and post-1989 patents.
2. Rothstein J approved both UK and US authority that
deplored the use of formulaic language and “rigid rules” on questions
of obviousness.34 His judgment itself should therefore not be read as
substituting a new set of formulae in place of Beloit‟s. He plainly
regarded obviousness as a question involving “a value judgment which
takes into account a variety of factors” some “purely technical, others
not”.35 His decision highlights some of the factors and the sort of
evidence that will help demonstrate their presence, and echoes the
approach already taken in decisions of the federal court.36
3. Beloit has been battered as an authority on both
anticipation and obviousness and deserves a couple of extra jabs for
other statements on obviousness that it makes and that have a habit of
reappearing.37 The dicta are: (a) “[e]very invention is obvious after it
has been made, and to no one more so than an expert in the field,”
and (b) obviousness is “a very difficult test to satisfy.”38
Those statements, while no doubt appropriate to the facts of
Beloit, should not be pressed to imply more than they say. The first,
that “[e]very invention is obvious after it has been made, and to no
one more so than an expert in the field”, fairly emphasizes the need
for tribunals to stand in the position of the ordinary skilled worker at
the priority date, knowing only what he knew then, and to judge
obviousness without hindsight. But it is sometimes pushed to imply,

anywhere in any way before the invention‟s priority date. For post-1989 Canadian
patents, s 28.3(1)(b) of the Canadian Patent Act requires the “subject-matter defined
by a claim” [i.e., the invention] not to “have been obvious on the claim date to a
person skilled in the art or science to which it pertains, having regard to information
disclosed before the claim date ... in such a manner that the information became
available to the public” anywhere.
34 Supra note 1 at 61 & 63.
35 Nichia Corp v. Argos Ltd, [2007] EWCA Civ 741 at 21-22, Jacob LJ (dissenting on
other grounds).
36 Eg, Janssen-Ortho, supra note 6 at 113, listing factors that the FCA on appeal
called “helpful to guide the required factual inquiry, and as a framework for the
factual analysis that must be undertaken” (at 25).
37 It may be significant that Rothstein J mentioned neither statement in his
comprehensive opinion.
38 Beloit, supra note 11 at 295 & 294.
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wrongly, that most applications are for unobvious inventions or that
most challenged patents are unobvious. No reliable data exist on
either of these points.
The second comment – obviousness, “a very difficult test to
satisfy” – may be useful as a warning not to set the bar too high before
inventions may qualify as patentable, but it should not be taken to
mean that obviousness is always very difficult to establish. How
difficult it is to prove anything always depends on the facts of the
case. Some inventions will withstand all obviousness attacks; to judge
and expert alike, they may seem miraculous when first patented, and
may seem miraculous even now. Others are immediately exposed
once a piece of prior art is produced. Yet others become obvious only
gradually as the evidence and arguments unfold. What looked clever
to a patent office examiner may later look trite to a court with fuller
material before it. Rothstein J‟s statements are in line with this view.
He said that courts should approach the “obvious to try” test
“cautiously”: it was not “a panacea for alleged infringers”, just one
factor to consider.39 But he made it equally clear that the usual balance
of probability standard of proof applies,40 as it does to all civil cases.41
4. In the Harvard Mouse case, in arguing for the patentability
of genetically modified animals, Binnie J said: “The mobility of capital
and technology makes it desirable that comparable jurisdictions with
comparable intellectual property legislation arrive (to the extent
permitted by the specifics of their own laws) at similar legal results”.42
Sanofi continues the harmonization trend through its reliance on
modern UK and US precedents over earlier Canadian caselaw that had
got stuck in a rut. Nothing in the Patent Act suggests that anticipation
or obviousness should be any harder or easier to find in Canada than
in any other major developed country. So cases where a Canadian
patent on a foreign invention is held unobvious after a court abroad
Supra note 1 at 64.
Ibid. at 66.
41 FH v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 at 40 & 45, Rothstein J: “I think it is time to say,
39
40

once and for all in Canada, that there is only one civil standard of proof at common
law and that is proof on a balance of probabilities. ... I think it is inappropriate to say
that there are legally recognized different levels of scrutiny of the evidence
depending upon the seriousness of the case. There is only one legal rule and that is
that in all cases, evidence must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge.”
42 Harvard College v. Canada (Comm‟r of Patents) , 2002 SCC 76 at 13, dissent
[Harvard Mouse].
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rules the corresponding patent obvious43 should become marginally
rarer now. Conflicting decisions will of course never be entirely
eliminated for national laws vary subtly, judges view and weigh facts
differently, and evidence may differ from one jurisdiction to
another.44
5. The Court left open the question of when the “obvious to
try” test will be appropriate to apply. Much will depend on common
practice in the art to which the invention belongs: “[i]n areas of
endeavour where advances are often won by experimentation, an
„obvious to try‟ test might be appropriate.”45 Presumably the expert
evidence will indicate whether a particular field of technology
qualifies as an area where the skilled worker is prone to search for
improvements through experimenting.
6. In asking what courses are obvious to try, Rothstein J
suggested putting the following questions:
(1) Is it more or less self-evident that what is being
tried ought to work? Are there a finite number of identified
predictable solutions known to persons skilled in the art?
(2) What is the extent, nature and amount of effort
required to achieve the invention? Are routine trials carried
out or is the experimentation prolonged and arduous, such
that the trials would not be considered routine?
(3) Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find
the solution the patent addresses?46
He added that “a possibility of finding the invention is not
enough.”47 Jacob LJ from the Court of Appeal in an English case
questioned: “Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried
ought to work?”48 Jacob LJ himself had equated this formula with
options that have “at least a fair expectation of success,”49 although the
The leading example is from Bayer, supra note 27, where a Canadian patent for a
German invention was found valid over a prior contrary ruling in Britain on the
corresponding UK patent.
44 Sanofi is itself an example of the phenomenon, if the Australian decision to
invalidate the patent in Apotex Pty Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis, supra note10, stands.
45 Supra note 1 at 68.
46 Ibid. at 69.
47 Ibid. at 85.
48 Saint-Gobain PAM SA v. Fusion Provida Ltd , [2005] EWCA Civ 177 at 35.
49 Generics (UK) Ltd v. Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co Ltd, [2009] EWCA Civ 646 at 22.
43
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House of Lords later qualified the adjective “fair” by saying: “How
much of an expectation would be needed depend[s] upon the
particular facts of the case.”50
One hopes Canadian courts will avoid the trap that English
courts seem close to falling into again: using verbal formulae apt for
one case as apt for all. Just as Beloit provided no “statutory
prescription” on obviousness,51 nor does English caselaw, nor does
Sanofi itself. Since 1989, obviousness is a statutory criterion in
Canada, and the court ultimately must construe its meaning in the
light of the history and purpose of the Patent Act as a whole,52 rather
than finding apt universal paraphrases for the word.
The point was usefully made in the Federal Court of Appeal
the year before the Supreme Court‟s decision in Sanofi. Sharlow JA for
the court agreed with the first instance judge (Hughes J) that “catch
phrases ... from the jurisprudence” were “not to be treated as though
they are rules of law.” Any list of factors, however useful, is:
not a list of legal rules to be slavishly followed; nor is it
an exhaustive list of the relevant factors. The task of the
trial judge in each case is to determine, on the basis of the
evidence, sound judgment and reason, the weight (if any) to
be given to the listed factors and any additional factors that
may be presented.”53

Conor Medsystems Inc v. Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc, [2008] UKHL 49 at 42,
Hoffmann L. In Intervet UK Ltd v Merial, [2010] EWHC 294 at [241] (Pat Ct)
Arnold J interpreted this to mean whether the skilled team “would have had a
reasonable expectation of success and ... would have been likely to succeed.”
51 Supra note 1 at 61.
52 Cf Binnie J in Harvard Mouse, supra note 42 at 11:
I accept, as does my colleague [Bastarache J], that the proper approach to
interpretation of this statute is to read the words “in their entire context and
in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: E. A.
Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87. .. The intent that
can properly be attributed to Parliament, based on the language it used and
the context of patent legislation generally, is that it considered it to be in the
public interest to encourage new and useful inventions without knowing
what such inventions would turn out to be and to that end inventors who
disclosed their work should be rewarded for their ingenuity.
53 Janssen-Ortho, supra note 6at 27-28.
50
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7. On obviousness, the Sanofi judgments are remarkable by
what is not mentioned: namely, the commercial success of Plavix® as
a factor favouring unobviousness. Presumably, as in the companion
US litigation,54 the parties presented no evidence on the point.
One may hope, but, alas, with no conviction, that this conduct
signals a trend against the use of this element as a relevant factor.55 In
NOC cases, reliance on it is anyway superfluous: why else would a
generic company want to copy a medicine unless it was commercially
successful? The same logic also applies to infringement litigation: a
patentee would only very rarely spend money enforcing its rights
unless the patent was for a winner. To allow commercial success to
diminish an obviousness defence may deter the raising of legitimate
cases where the attack is warranted on the technical evidence.
Giving weight to commercial success seems to reflect a natural
desire to reward merit and deter free-riders. It is patent law‟s
counterpart to copyright law‟s vacuous “rough practical test” that
what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.56 In a
competitive market, what sells well may be prima facie worth
protecting from the seller‟s viewpoint. In public policy terms, it
should prima facie be worth leaving open to competition. Someone
has to be first to market with a winner: being that someone does not
make the outcome an invention, for a product may be new and
attractive, yet obvious.
Commercial success nonetheless crops up constantly as a
reason to hold a patent unobvious or otherwise valid, especially in
borderline cases.57 In Canadian litigation, it tends to surface too early
and effectively shapes the eventual trial. Once a defendant pleads
unobviousness, the parties inevitably reveal during pre-trial discovery
how their products are faring on the market.58 At trial, each side feels
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc, supra note 10at 392.
See, eg Janssen-Ortho, supra note 6 at 113 & 114 #7, on appeal FCA at 25, #7.
56 University of London Press Ltd v. University Tutorial Press Ltd, [1916] 2 Ch 601,
610 (Peterson J), discredited as a “misleading ... rhetorical device” in Baigent v.
Random House Group Ltd, [2007] EWCA Civ 247 at [97], Lloyd LJ.
57 Haberman v. Jackel Inc, [1999] FSR 683 (Pat Ct, Laddie J), where the evidence
54
55

tipped a close case of a very simple advance – a baby‟s spill-proof training cup –
towards a finding of validity and infringement.
58 Dimplex North America Ltd v. CFM Majestic Inc (2003), 28 CPR (4th) 266 (Fed TD,
Henaghan J). At trial, the court held that the commercial success of both parties‟
products was evidence of non-obviousness: 2006 FC 586 at 101 (Mosley J).
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it has to make something of the commercial success or failure of the
products or processes, or risk adverse comment.
By contrast, current British practice disfavours pre-trial
disclosure of commercial success, and the evidence may altogether be
excluded at trial if it would prove little.59 A leading British case states
that, if admitted, the evidence “must be kept firmly in place”; its
weight “will vary from case to case”; it “must not be permitted, by
reason of its volume and complexity, to obscure the fact that it is no
more than an aid in assessing the primary evidence.”60 Yet still the
idea keeps popping up. Even judges who avoid citing commercial
success as a formal reason to support unobviousness nevertheless
cannot seem to avoid mentioning it elsewhere as an implicit reason
for upholding a patent.61
One is left with the uncomfortable feeling that the factor is, at
best, a costly distraction or, at worst, a short-cut to the wrong
destination.62 One can only applaud the parties‟ decision in Sanofi not
to raise it.

Supra note 35 at 6; Alan Nuttall Ltd v. Fri-Jado UK Ltd, [2008] EWHC 1311 at 5-6
(Pat Ct),(Prescott QC).
60 Mölnlycke AB v. Proctor & Gamble Ltd, [1994] RPC 49, 112 (CA), (Nicholls VC).
61 Eg, Supra note 50 at 12.
62 Cf Supra note 35, questioning whether discovery of an inventor‟s notes and
experiments was proportionate to the stakes involved in the case.
59
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